Finished 24 October 2025. I’ve spent years detailing the operational conflicts that are actively undermining the Base Honor Guard program online through my website and social media. This is more than just a turf war; it’s about the legal requirement to preserve a congressional mandate.
To download this position paper in PDF, click here. Download the sample suggested DAFI rewrite here.
Executive Summary: Policy Negligence and the Degradation of the Air Force Honor Guard Mission
The U.S. Air Force’s sacred commitment to providing dignified Military Funeral Honors, a mandate codified by DoD Directive 1300.22, is being systematically undermined by a failure in internal policy compliance and organizational design. The Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for DAFI 34-160 was negligent in its policy rewrite by excluding the specialized expertise of the US Air Force Honor Guard (AFHG), enabling Air Force Mortuary Affairs Operations (AFMAO) to assert unwarranted program oversight.
The result is administrative mission creep and created an untenable “serving two masters” conflict for Base Honor Guard (BHG) Program Managers, leading directly to the degradation of ceremonial excellence and the documented denial of Military Funeral Honors to veterans’ families.
To restore accountability and ensure compliance, three immediate actions are required:
- Organizational Reform: The BHG must be immediately designated a Wing-Level Agency with mandatory, permanent staffing (TSgt NCOIC, SSgt Lead Trainer) to ensure stability, rank authority, ceremonial excellence, and resource protection.
- Policy Correction: DAFI 34-160 must be rewritten to redesignate the AFHG as the sole OPR and functional manager for all ceremonial standards and BHG program management, relegating AFMAO to the role of Functional Manager exclusively for technical mortuary affairs policy input.
- Accountability: Due to the systematic failure to comply with established directives and the resulting harm to the veteran community, the actions of leadership at AF/A1 and AFMAO must be investigated for potential violations of Article 92 (Failure to Obey an Order or Regulation) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, alongside a formal review by the DoD Inspector General (DoD IG) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO).
History: From Local Chaos to Service-Wide Policy
The history of the Air Force Base Honor Guard program is one of evolving standards and eventual centralization.
The Era of Local Standards (1947–1995)
For decades, the execution of military honors was highly decentralized. From the late 1940s to the 1960s, ceremonial duties—such as flag details, color guards, and funerals—were primarily handled by Law Enforcement/Security Police (now Security Forces) personnel. In the late 1960s and 1970s, partly driven by the increased operational tempo of the Vietnam War, dedicated honor guard units began to form across various Wings and Air Divisions (or “Battalions,” as known in other services).
However, these early units lacked proper guidance. Until 1995, each Base Honor Guard was technically managed by the local Mortuary Affairs Office (MAO), but over time, the relationship was largely ineffective, and the Wing honor guard did its job without input from the MAO since it was a Wing-level organization. As a result, units often had to invent their own techniques and standards, frequently adopting and altering procedures found in the legacy Army Field Manual for drill.
The lack of oversight created significant inconsistency: if you were on the honor guard (we weren’t designated as ceremonial guardsmen back then) and PCS’d (changed duty stations), you were typically required to retrain on every ceremonial element at your new base because “Well, this is how we do it.” For example, while I served in the early 1990s with the 836th Air Division Honor Guard at Davis-Monthan AFB, the team had to establish many of their own procedures due to the absence of clear guidance. We just did our jobs to the best of our abilities, and, with great leadership and Division support, we took excellent care of southern Arizona.
The Shift to a Single Standard
The pivotal change came in 1995 with the implementation of a new vision championed by CMSgt Timothy Dickens, who desired a single, unified ceremonial standard across the entire Air Force.
This shift finally gave Airmen specific, codified standards to follow, ensuring consistency for every honor guard member, now identified as “Ceremonial Guardsmen” across the service. This standardization effort eventually led to the professional program seen today.
(As a point of personal experience, even as late as 1994 while I was stationed at NATO HQ Allied Forces Central Europe in the Netherlands, I was the creator and NCOIC of a joint honor guard that included Airmen from Geilenkirchen Air Base. We frequently merged for ceremonies in the BENELUX and France, often working without a unified set of Air Force-specific guidelines, but those guidelines did get published and we were eventually in the new uniform and performing properly.)
The Eventual Goal
The transition to the AFHG having oversite of the BHG program was to ensure standards across the USAF both in uniform wear (we used to wear the Law Enforcement Elite Gate Guard uniform with the beret since the honor guards developed directly from them) and procedures and techniques. The Ceremonial Uniform was a key part of the standardization effort and AFHG’s identity as a ceremonial unit, distinct from a security function since we sometimes would be confused with Gate Guards.
The improvement is considerable! We can see that in performances around the USAF, but we can also see that it has never really come to 100% fruition as initially hoped and part of that lack of uniformity is based on several factors.
Negatives Impacting the BHG Mission
- Congress cutting the military again and again
- Installation and unit commanders who “focus on the mission” and disregard the BHG which is evidenced by:
- Sending bad Airmen to the program “Honor Guard will fix ‘em”
- Throwing money at the team and never visiting
- Reducing the NCOIC position to a SSgt with barely five years in service
- Reducing the personnel for the BHG and having every leadership position be the responsibility of the NCOIC (he is the trainer, scheduler, weapons NCO, vehicle NCO, building NCO, armorer, equipment maintainer, admin, and must attend meetings, etc.)
- Lack of OIC appointment
- DAFI 34-160 being rewritten in such a way that removes AFHG authority
AFMAO’s control focuses only on policy compliance and metrics, failing to enforce the professional/ceremonial standards the AFHG is best positioned to manage, thereby exacerbating local leadership failures. It’s not AFMAOs job to run an honor guard, it is their job to provide administrative and logistical guidance.
Quality Control and Standardized Procedures
10 U.S.C. § 1491 Funeral honors functions at funerals for veterans (The Military Funeral Honors Act). This law gives the Secretary of (Defense) War and the Service Secretaries a mandate to provide MFH for all honorably released veterans.
DoD Instruction 1300.15, Military Funeral Support.
- The Source: serves as the top-level policy, stemming directly from the U.S. Code (10 U.S.C. § 1491), which mandates that the military services render funeral honors to eligible veterans upon request. This reinforces that the mission is non-negotiable and legally required.
- Air Force Compliance: DAFI 34-160 explicitly states that it implements and complies with DoDI 1300.15. The analysis of DAFI 34-160 must be framed by whether it truly adheres to the spirit and intent of the DoD Instruction.
- Commander Support (Section 3.1.a): Commanders at all levels must support paying a final tribute and must respond expeditiously and sensitively to requests.
- Quality Control (Section 3.2.j): Assigns the military services the responsibility to “Ensure proper decorum for military funeral honors, including trained personnel, implementation of standardized military funeral honors procedures, dignified, respectful honor guard details, professional dress and appearance, synchronization of movement, and regular quality control of funeral details.”
This final point on quality control and standardized procedures is where you can powerfully argue that AFMAO’s mission creep is subverting the service’s primary obligation (the AFHG) to maintain that quality and standardization.
DoDD 1300.22, Mortuary Affairs Policy.
1. Core Commitment and Philosophy. The Directive establishes the fundamental national commitment to return all deceased Servicemembers to their Next of Kin (NOK) in a dignified, reverent, and respectful manner, as expeditiously as possible. This philosophical commitment is the driving force behind all subsequent MA procedures.
2. Institutional Framework and Governance. The Directive is key to understanding who is responsible for MA policy at the highest levels:
- Central Joint Mortuary Affairs Board (CJMAB): DoDD 1300.22 establishes the CJMAB as a permanent standing DoD board. Its primary role is to develop recommendations for DoD MA policy, procedures, mobilization planning, and mortuary services. This shows how Mortuary Affairs is managed and coordinated across all Military Services.
- Executive Agent Change: The Directive cancels the Secretary of the Army’s designation as the DoD Executive Agent for the Contingency Fatality Operations portion of Mortuary Affairs, signifying a shift toward a more centralized, joint-Service oversight (the CJMAB).
3. Key Operational Policy Mandates. The document provides the high-level policy that guides detailed execution procedures:
- Preservation of Remains: It mandates that the preservation of remains must be given the highest priority and that every effort will be made to preserve the condition of remains, including those recovered from past conflicts.
- Contaminated Remains: It provides policy regarding human remains contaminated with biological, chemical, or radiological agents. It emphasizes mitigation efforts to return remains through routine channels, but stresses that protecting the health of Servicemembers and the public takes precedence. It also authorizes cremation of biologically or chemically contaminated remains (not radiological) if requested by the Person Authorized to Direct Disposition (PADD).
- Escorts: It mandates that the remains of deceased Servicemembers will be continuously escorted by a Servicemember of appropriate grade from the preparing mortuary to the funeral home or other location requested by the family.
- Scope of Coverage: It clarifies that MA support and transportation are provided on a reimbursable basis for authorized contractor personnel (CAAF) and, upon request, for U.S. citizens through coordination with the Department of State (DOS).
The institutional framework for the care of the fallen is rigorously established by the high-level DoD Directive 1300.22, which sets the ethical commitment to dignity, and the executing DoD Instruction 1300.29, which codifies the necessary operational procedures and logistics. This dual policy structure proves that dignity is a formal, non-negotiable mandate.
This mandate is fulfilled through two entirely separate, highly specialized entities: AFMAO, which requires technical expertise in recovery, preservation, identification, and logistics, and the AFHG, which requires mastery of precision drill and ceremonial protocol. While the missions of both organizations converge to serve the Next of Kin, the operational skill sets they demand are wholly distinct, with their functions only overlapping slightly at moments of ceremonial presentation, such as the Dignified Transfer.
The Duties
The current structure of the Base Honor Guard (BHG) program is managed by two separate entities, which inevitably leads to conflict. Air Force Mortuary Affairs Operations (AFMAO) oversees the entire BHG program’s management and policy. This authority was centralized when the mortuary affairs function merged into AFMAO between 2008 and 2010. Conversely, The U.S. Air Force Honor Guard (AFHG)—a separate squadron—is the official service standard-bearer. The AFHG creates the ceremonial standards that all Base Honor Guard units must follow and deploys training teams to ensure uniformity across the service. With AFMAO managing the program’s administration and AFHG dictating the ceremonial execution, local BHG teams receive direction from two different central authorities.
| AFI 34-501 (2019) | DAFI 34-160 (2022) |
| 7.17. The USAF Honor Guard will: | 7.18. AFHG. The AFHG will: |
| 7.17.1. Establish procedural guidance for standardized uniform wear, ceremonies, equipment, and conduct ceremonial training programs. (T-3). | 7.18.1. In coordination with AFMAO, establish procedural guidance for standardized uniform wear, ceremonies, equipment, and conduct training for the Base HG programs. (T-2). |
| 7.17.2. Coordinate all uniform issues concerning base honor guards through 11th Wing/CC, HQ USAF/A1S, HQ AFPC/DPSOOC, and submit requests through the annual uniform board. (T-3). | Taken care of in 7.18.1 |
| 7.17.3. Conduct regional Staff Assistance Visits when requested by Major Commands and bases. The requesting Major Command or base will fund the Staff Assistance Visit. (T-3). | 7.18.2. If requested by AFMAO, assist in regional Staff Assistance Visits when requested by Major Commands or bases. The requesting Major Command or base will fund the visit. (T-3). |
| 7.17.4. Provide AFMAO and base-level honor guard with projected USAF Honor Guard training schedules for units or bases to use in budgeting training requirements. (T-3). | 7.18.3. In coordination with AFMAO and, provide base-level HG with projected In-Residence training, or online if available and appropriate, and Mobile Training Team schedules for units or bases to use in budgeting training requirements. (T-2). The AFHG and AFMAO will update the training, at a minimum, on a biannual basis. (T-3). |
| 7.17.5. Provide procedural guidelines for base honor guard teams, entitled Base Honor Guard Manual, available on under the Base Honor Guards link at: https://www.honorguard.af.mil and ensure the guidance provided is current. (T-3). | 7.18.4. In concert with AFMAO, develop procedural guidelines for base HG teams through the entitled Base HG Manual and ensure the guidance provided is current. (T-2). |
| 7.17.6. Ensure ceremonial training programs and uniform issues are coordinated through 11th Wing Commander to HQ USAF/A1S. (T-3). Provide coordinated changes to AFMAO and base honor guard. The USAF Honor Guard will update the training, at a minimum, on a biannual basis. (T-3). | |
| 7.17.7. Provide a current list of available training aides to AFMAO and base level honor guards and advise the same when new training aides become available. (T-3). | 7.18.5. In coordination with AFMAO, provide a current list of available training aides to Base HGs, and advise the same when new training aides become available. (T-2). Training aids will be made available on the Base HG SharePoint when updated. |
| 7.17.8. Act as Office of Primary Responsibility for all HQ Air Force Level funeral support. This will include current and former Secretaries of the Air Force, Chiefs of Staff and Chief Master Sergeants of the Air Force. All funeral support will be coordinated through 11 Operations Group. (T-3). | 7.18.6. Act as Office of Primary Responsibility for all support to USAF-level funeral requests. This will include current and former Secretaries of the Air Force, Chiefs of Staff and Chief Master Sergeants of the Air Force. All funeral support for USAF-level members will be requested through the 11th Operations Group for support and will be reported to AFMAO upon completion. (T-1). |
After putting the two versions of the Mortuary Affairs Program AFI together, I can see definite manipulation of wording to move every aspect of the BHG program under AFMAO control, both administrative and operational, and kick the AFHG out of the way. However, I do understand the need for a single agency to control the program, and it should not be AFMAO. The AFHG should be the OPR and AFMAO receiving required reports and providing informational administration.
AFHG has been training BHG personnel, and providing oversite for administrative, logistical, and operational support for 30 years and now, through what seems like underhanded tactics, we have the rewriting and publishing of the governing document without coordinating that rewrite with the squadron that is at the face of the program.
No one looks at a BHG and thinks “Hmm, AFMAO did a great job there.” No, the intention of the merging of the BHG program into the AFHG was to have Ceremonial Guardsmen at the AF and base levels and have them be virtually indistinguishable. Literally everyone looks at AF-level and base-level Ceremonial Guardsmen as being the same. There are slight differences in the uniform, but the intention from those early days in the 1990s was to make all of us virtually indistinguishable enabling Active Duty, National Guard, and Reserve Airmen to support activities in Washington DC when needed.
No one knows or cares* that AFMAO is involved in MFH at any location at any time. They recognize the uniform as “Air Force Honor Guard” and care that the Airmen are doing their job with the highest level of excellence possible and that’s not able to happen because the AFHG is being hobbled.
*I am fully aware of and thankful for the mortuary services AFMAO provides.
The institutional commitment to dignity and respect for the fallen is codified at the highest levels, starting with DoD Directive 1300.22, which mandates that the military services render funeral honors as a matter of moral and legal obligation. This profound commitment requires strict adherence to the US Air Force Honor Guard’s (AFHG) specialized ceremonial standards to ensure flawless execution.
However, this entire framework was catastrophically destabilized by a critical failure in policy governance: the 2022 revision of the DAFI 34-160, Mortuary Affairs Program. The Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for this DAFI demonstrated clear organizational negligence by systematically excluding the AFHG’s operational expertise, creating a policy vacuum that allowed the Air Force Mortuary Affairs Operations (AFMAO) to inject its logistical and administrative priorities into the ceremonial domain. This policy oversight is the inciting incident, replacing essential ceremonial expertise with administrative control and directly fueling the mission instability and disciplinary decay now observable across the Base Honor Guard program.
Policy Failure and Disciplinary Erosion
The institutional commitment to dignity, established by DoD policies, is systematically undermined by a critical failure in Air Force policy compliance, resulting in fragmented guidance and disciplinary decay. Specifically, the OPR for the DAFI governing mortuary affairs that only references ceremonial honors has demonstrated a fundamental breach of its core function by excluding the specialized expertise of the AFHG during the policy rewrite as I detail in the next section, Governing Directives.
This omission is not a simple bureaucratic oversight; it represents a failure of organizational compliance and the neglect to maintain informed, accurate, and standardized practice. This top-down negligence created a severe policy vacuum, enabling the mission creep of AFMAO into ceremonial responsibilities that clearly belong to the AFHG.
The most acute consequence of this administrative failure falls on the local BHG Program Managers, who are forced into an untenable position: they are now essentially serving two masters (two distinct Career Field Managers, CFMs). One chain provides specialized guidance rooted in ceremonial protocol, AFHG, while the other, increasingly authoritative chain stems from AFMAO, whose core expertise lies in the distinct realm of technical mortuary logistics and not ceremonial functions.
This is Not “The Office”
No Air Force Specialty has ever had two CFMs in the history of the service. Frankly, that goes for the rest of the US military.
This untenable scenario—forcing BHG managers to align with two distinct CFMs—is not just complex; it is an organizational absurdity. The situation mirrors the chaotic, detrimental confusion depicted in the television show, The Office, when the Scranton branch briefly operated under the leadership of two managers, one responsible for “big decisions” and one for “day-to-day operations.”
While that dual-leadership structure provided comedic tension in a fictional workplace, its reality in a mission-critical military specialty is deeply detrimental. The resulting ambiguity and conflicting priorities paralyze decision-making, erode the sense of a single unified mission, and contribute significantly to the drop in morale observed among dedicated BHG Program Managers worldwide.
The Cost of Erosion: Loss of Institutional Cohesion
The most severe consequence of the OPR’s negligence and AFMAO’s overreach is the catastrophic loss of institutional knowledge and cohesion. The deliberate and unilateral assertion of program authority by AFMAO has fundamentally reversed years of dedicated effort to create a standardized, professional force. The successful integration and “gelling” of the U.S. Air Force Honor Guard (AFHG) with Base Honor Guard (BHG) units required over a decade of sustained focus on training and standardization. AFMAO’s conflicting guidance, resource cuts, and assumption of ceremonial duties are estimated to have set the entire BHG program back by at least fifteen years, critically compromising the foundation of specialized expertise necessary to sustain ceremonial perfection nationwide.
Accountability at the Policy Custodian Level
The culpability for this systemic failure extends directly to the highest levels of the policy chain. AF/A3, acting as the OPR for the DAFI rewrite, failed in its fundamental duty to safeguard the integrity of the ceremonial mission.
This office, located at the Pentagon, cannot claim innocence, as its failure to intervene in the conflicting policy language suggests one of two highly culpable scenarios: either dereliction through culpable ignorance (failing to vet the content and consult the AFHG, the subject matter expert) or active institutional complicity (fully supporting AFMAO’s mission expansion). In either case, AF/A3’s failure as the policy custodian makes the office equally responsible for the systemic damage, the erosion of specialized unit cohesion, and the resulting loss of good order and discipline.
Dereliction of Duty
This structural ambiguity, which the OPR failed to prevent, leads to pervasive organizational conflict and arguably constitutes a legal issue of dereliction of duty concerning policy maintenance. This institutional failure directly fuels a catastrophic degradation of good order and discipline and the erosion of morale among BHG Program Managers who, committed to reverent service, are continually compromised by conflicting and functionally inadequate policy guidance.
Article 92 of the UCMJ
Dereliction of duty is a uniquely military offense specifically intended by Congress to ensure the proper performance of duty within the military service; servicemembers’ military duties relate to activities which are reasonably necessary to safeguard and protect the morale, discipline, and usefulness of the members of a command and are directly connected with the maintenance of good order in the services; thus, the dereliction of duty offense promotes good order and discipline in the military; in light of the military nature of the offense and its limited authorized punishment, a negligence mens rea standard is appropriate for certain dereliction offenses.
Just this section, if not the full paper, fully supports my call for a UCMJ Article 92 investigation for both the AFMAO and AF/A3, holding them accountable for their lack of performance of their military duties whether by court-martial or nonjudicial punishment.
From https://www.armfor.uscourts.gov/digest/IIIA16.htm
Governing Directives
The Directorate of Services under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower, Personnel and Services (AF/A1) at Headquarters Air Force, is the office of primary responsibility (OPR) for DAFI 34-160, Mortuary Affairs Program and AFMAO is the functional manager that executes the program policy. This Air Force Instruction establishes the overarching policy framework for the Base Honor Guard (BHG) program.
- Primary Mission and Priority
- Mandate: The instruction solidifies the Military Funeral Honors (MFH) mission as the primary and non-negotiable mission for every Base Honor Guard.
- Precedence: It explicitly states that providing Military Funeral Honors takes precedence over all other Base Honor Guard functions (such as retirements, changes of command, awards ceremonies, or community events). BHGs must be able to support MFH requests first.
- This pendulum swung to the extreme a few years ago with BHG members barely supporting base functions at except to train squadron members for a couple of hours here and there on flag fold for a retirement or how to present the colors for a group or squadron function.
- Oversight and Management (AFMAO’s Role)
- Program Ownership: The DAFI places the overall management, policy, and compliance oversight for the entire Air Force Base Honor Guard Program under the functional control of Air Force Mortuary Affairs Operations (AFMAO).
- Policy and Guidance: It is the foundational document that allows AFMAO to develop, interpret, and issue policy and guidance for the 141 Total Force (Active, Guard, and Reserve) BHG units worldwide. This includes standards for eligibility, composition of the detail (e.g., flag folder, bugler, pallbearers, firing party), and coordination.
- Roles and Responsibilities
- Installation Commanders: Commanders are assigned responsibility for establishing and maintaining a Base Honor Guard that meets the requirements laid out in the DAFI.
- Eligibility and Composition: The instruction outlines the mandatory composition of a Funeral Honors detail, which, by law (Congress mandated this back in 2000), is a minimum of two uniformed members (at least one of whom is a service representative) who fold and present the flag and sound Taps. The DAFI also provides guidance on the components of Full Military Honors (e.g., pallbearers, firing party, color guard) for active-duty and retiree funerals.
In essence, DAFI 34-160 is the “Why and What” of the BHG program seemingly removing the AFHG from the equation, “we’ll let you know when we need you”.
From the Website
Here are some extracts from the text describing the responsibilities of the different AFMAO divisions.
The AFMAO Operations Support Division.
- “backfills the Air Force Honor Guard Team for dignified transfers and is responsible for instructing Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force carry teams for ground training.” (emphasis mine)
A “Carry Team” is a reference to the Body Bearers of all service honor guard units (The Old Guard, Marine Barracks Washington, Navy Ceremonial Guard, AF and SF Honor Guards, and the Coast Guard Ceremonial Hoor Guard) who carry the transfer case(s) at Dover Air Force Base.
This statement raises two questions:
- What does this “backfill” mean? It means:
- If the AFHG Body Bearers have an operations tempo that restricts them from carrying out a Dignified Transfer mission, another team can step in.
- Does AFMAO “backfill” the other service body/casket bearer teams? If not, then why is there a need to do this for the AF?
- The answer is: AFMAO does not “backfill” any other service because there is never a requirement to do so for any of the services, including the AF.
- AFMAO is not a ceremonially operational unit. Historically, it has only provided guidance to BHGs.
- If the AFHG ever had a mission load that prevented a carry at Dover, there is the Dover BHG that, as part of their original stated mission, is to “backfill” the AFHG. It’s their job to do that when required.
The AFMAO Readiness and Plans Division.
- “management of Air Force-wide Honor Guard programs”
- “management of mortuary and honor guard policy”
- “provides mortuary and honor guard policies and support”
- “the Honor Guard section provides management oversight, policy, guidance and support”
- “The Honor Guard section provides management oversight, policy, guidance and support”
- “The Honor Guard section manages policy and standards”
(emphasis mine for each quote above)
While the Airmen currently assigned to AFMAO’s Headquarters staff may not perform daily ceremonies at Dover Air Force Base (where AFMAO is located), the staff in the Honor Guard Program Management section are specifically chosen for their prior experience with the mission they now manage:
- Program Manager Experience is Mandatory: Personnel selected for the key management roles at AFMAO’s Honor Guard section often have a background in the mission. For instance, reports indicate that managers assigned to AFMAO previously served as Base Honor Guard Managers or Lead Trainers at an installation Honor Guard.
- A “Manager” vs. an “Operator” Role: The training AFMAO conducts is the Honor Guard Program Managers Course (PMC). This course focuses on:
- Policy and Compliance (DAFI 34-160).
- Resource Management (e.g., ammunition, budget).
- Administrative Oversight (managing scheduling, reporting metrics).
- Coordination with the U.S. Air Force Honor Guard (AFHG).
The role is not to teach drill and ceremonies to new recruits (that’s the job of the AFHG Technical School instructors), but to train the leaders and NCOs who are responsible for running the entire Base Honor Guard program at their respective installations. They teach the “how-to” of program management and policy enforcement, which is their mandated function.
| AFMAO | Program Management, Policy, and Oversight for ALL Base Honor Guards (the 141 Total Force units). AFMAO is the Functional Manager for the Mortuary Affairs and Honor Guard Program across the Department of the Air Force. Their training is for Program Managers. While the current Airmen on the AFMAO Program Management staff are not performing daily ceremonies, they are mandated to coordinate with the AFHG at Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling to develop the curriculum and standards for the Base Honor Guard Program Managers Course. In essence, they are tasked to take the ceremonial standards from the experts (AFHG) and wrap them into a management and policy framework for the rest of the Air Force. Their function is not to teach the rifle manual, but to teach the Base Program Manager how to procure the rifles, schedule the details, and comply with the policy (DAFI 34-160). |
| AFHG | Ceremonial Execution and Standardization for the National Capital Region (NCR) and the AFHG Technical School (the training pipeline for new Base Honor Guardsmen). Their training is for Ceremonial Guardsmen. |
The Article
Back in 2024, an article published at Mortuary.af.mil. The title of the article is “AFMAO Honor Guard section ensures success of base Honor Guard program”. I accessed the article on October 22, 2025, and created the downloadable PDF (link at the bottom of this section).
Let’s review the bullet points on the screen in the image. This is a photo from the header of the page with the article.
- Administrative Tracking: AFMAO correctly administers the required tracking and metric reporting for Military Funeral Honors (MFH) execution.
- MFH Reporting: AFMAO is responsible for the formal consolidation and reporting of final MFH mission data.
- Redundant Coordination: AFMAO has inserted itself as an unnecessary intermediary in flyover coordination, a function properly executed by Headquarters Air Force (HAF/A3).
- Policy Interpretation: AFMAO provides necessary guidance regarding the policy for refusal of honors, based on statutory eligibility criteria.
- Unwarranted Policy Assumption: AFMAO assumed responsibility for managing BHG Areas of Responsibility (AORs), which were originally established by the AFHG several years prior.
- Redundant Instruction: There is no operational requirement for AFMAO to provide management briefings during AFHG’s foundational ceremonial (Tech School) course; this practice creates redundancy and conflicting guidance.
- Unnecessary Policy Courses: AFMAO’s decision to independently host in-residence courses unnecessarily duplicates the existing, certified curriculum provided by AFHG. AFMAO is not a ceremonial certifying authority.
- Redundant Training Teams: The use of AFMAO Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) for ceremonial subjects duplicates the established function and expertise of AFHG MTTs.
- Clear Expertise Domain: CAMO and MO/MT courses are inherently specific to technical mortuary and casualty affairs and are outside the functional scope of ceremonial duties.
- Clear Authority Overreach: AFMAO exceeded its functional charter by asserting program oversight for duties where its expertise is restricted to specific mortuary affairs policy.
- Inspection Authority Conflict: While coordination with Civil Engineering (CE) for remains, management is a valid AFMAO function, asserting primary Unit Effectiveness Inspection (UEI) oversight for ceremonial standards over AFHG constitutes an authorityconflict.
- (Updated 29 Oct 2025) Munitions Function: Munitions Unit Functional Manager (MUFM). Users (BHG in this case) coordinate with the MUFM annually to ensure they have the appropriate munitions allocations, and 5 year forecasts are completed to ensure we ask congress for adequate funds.
Direct Contradictions to Historical and Current Standards
The AFMAO article uses three key phrases that demonstrate an overreach of authority and a direct challenge to the AFHG’s traditional and codified roles:
- Claim of Full Program Oversight
| AFMAO Article Quote | Contradiction/Analysis |
| “…oversees the Department of the Air Force’s Honor Guard program, providing management oversight, policy, guidance and support…” | Contradiction: This language claims total control over policy and guidance. In DAFI 34-160, the AFHG is required to “In coordination with AFMAO, establish procedural guidance for standardized uniform wear, ceremonies, equipment, and conduct training…” The DAFI requires coordination and vests the AFHG with the role of establishing the guidance. The article makes no mention of AFHG involvement, presenting AFMAO as the singular source of policy and guidance. |
2. Claim of Curriculum and Training Ownership
| AFMAO Article Quote | Contradiction/Analysis |
| “Acting as the guiding force behind the training, curriculum and operations for 141 total force units…” | Contradiction: This is the most direct claim of operational overreach. The AFHG Technical School at Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling (JBA) is the institutional source and curriculum developer for ceremonial training. AFMAO’s mandate is to teach the program management to Base Honor Guard (BHG) leaders via the Program Managers Course (PMC). By claiming to be the “guiding force behind the training and curriculum,” AFMAO usurps the primary function of the AFHG—the creation and instruction of the ceremonial standard. |
3. Exclusion of the AFHG
| AFMAO Article Quote | Contradiction/Analysis |
| The article details AFMAO’s role in policy, curriculum, training, and direct family interface… yet it never mentions the AFHG once. | Analysis: The omission of the AFHG is a powerful rhetorical device. If AFMAO’s job is to coordinate with AFHG to develop curriculum (as per the DAFI), failing to credit or mention the AFHG in an article about the Honor Guard program suggests an intention to minimize or erase the AFHG’s role in the public eye. The public face of Air Force ceremonial excellence is being replaced with an administrative entity. |
You can imagine my lack of trust for AFMAO at the moment and after this article publishes, some could be quite upset at my exposing their blatant hypocrisy. Here is the link to the original article from 29 August 2024: https://www.mortuary.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/3889969/afmao-honor-guard-section-ensures-success-of-base-honor-guard-program/. However, I saved the article to a PDF which you can download from my MediaFire account here: https://www.mediafire.com/file/dqvglct2b6q44ul/AFMAO+article+on+Honor+Guard+section+ensures+success+of+base+Honor+Guard+program.pdf/file.
Internet Comments
OK, parts of the internet can be an absolute sewer, I understand that. I’m posting these few quotes here to illustrate the point that there are many who know about this overreach and are upset that this has taken place. I’m not looking for or trying to establish consensus, I’m just giving and sample of what the ceremonial drill community is thinking on Reddit, with the most direct conversation centering on manpower and resource decisions made by AFMAO that negatively impact the BHG program.
While there aren’t many posts directly discussing the new DAFI’s language regarding ceremonial standards (the core of my paper), the threads do support the idea that AFMAO is making unilateral, high-level policy changes that degrade the operational capacity of BHGs.
Here are some direct and paraphrased quotes from Reddit, primarily focusing on AFMAO’s decision to cut Military Personnel Appropriation (MPA) Reservists from the Honor Guard Program:
The Impact of AFMAO Manpower Cuts
These quotes relate to the operational fallout from AFMAO’s decision to cut certain Reserve positions that were crucial to filling the BHG mission, supporting my point that AFMAO’s administrative decisions are hurting the mission.
- Paraphrased Sentiment (Direct Denial): “AFMAO decided to cut all reserve MPAs from Honor Guard across the Air Force… So how does big Air Force fill in where it was struggling to fill in to start with? You’re gonna start seeing Military Funeral Honors be denied.”
- Quote (Lack of Manpower): “Yes, with nobody to put in them, cause the units don’t have the manpower to fill them to start with. That’s why they needed the reserve MPAs to start with. When you don’t have the manpower to do them, you can’t do them. Pretty simple formula.”
- Quote (Loss of Talent): “They’ll lose some exceptional reservists. I won’t name them, but they’ve got these two guys who are the beating heart of that place. They perform ceremonies at the D.C. level, basically run the training program, and are always developing the junior Airmen.”
- Quote (Veteran Impact): “Their tempo, raw volume of details, and size of AOR is gigantic… Without the reservists, and without AD doing their part, then it’s really only going to hurt the veteran community.”
General Support and Standardization Issues
These quotes show the grassroots focus remains on the ceremonial product and perfection, which is the AFHG’s mission, rather than AFMAO’s administrative processes.
- Quote (Importance of Excellence): “Make sure your folks are training HARD. The job demands perfection. The lasting image of the entire US military that many of these families will have are of your Guardsmen.”
- Quote (Ceremonial Focus): “You’re the one making sure your team’s drill movements are flawless, every step, turn, and salute executed like it’s second nature. A misstep isn’t just a personal flub it’s a letdown to the legacy you’re upholding…”
- Quote (Perceived Quality): “I wish base honor guard was an AFSC, I would have done it my whole career.” (This reflects the desire for a full-time professional force—a core goal of the AFHG standardization. How can we not see this?)
Conclusion and Solution
The separation, as the Air Force sees it, is that AFMAO manages the program and the compliance, while the AFHG creates the standards and trains the performers. For any large organization like the Air Force, policy (AFMAO’s job) is the mechanism that ensures 141 different units all operate to the same minimum standard, regardless of the quality of the local performers or local leadership.
AFMAO prioritizes policy/mortuary support; AFHG prioritizes ceremonial excellence. These roles are mutually exclusive, and the mission overtake creep that had occurred over the last decade has been tantamount to a malicious, passive-aggressive takeover of ceremonial duties.
The intent behind the rewrite, whether driven by organizational ego (former BHG missing Ceremonial Flight?), mission creep, or a misunderstanding of ceremonial expertise, ultimately places administrative control over operational perfection. By centralizing ceremonial functions under a mortuary and policy staff, the Air Force accepts the risk of degrading the performance standards established over decades by the AFHG, purely for the sake of centralized reporting.
The US Air Force Honor Guard must be designated the sole Office of Primary Responsibility for all ceremonial standards and training documentation, while AFMAO retains the role of Functional Manager only for the actual Mortuary Affairs portion of the DAFI (Casualty, PADD support, contracts) and simply receives mandatory mission reports from the BHGs. This clearly divides the functional area of expertise.
This needs to happen immediately, regardless of the feelings of anyone involved. Institutional correction requires more than a simple restructuring. AFMAO must formally acknowledge the overreach in policy and curriculum language and actively work with the AFHG to re-establish the clear lines of authority, ensuring that the foundational mission of ceremonial excellence remains codified under the organization that possesses the operational expertise.
Organizational Restructure and Cultural Mandate
To rectify the core issues of mission instability, cultural dismissiveness, and leadership vulnerability at the BHG level, a complete organizational overhaul is required, effectively stabilizing the program with permanent, qualified staff and elevated authority.
The following structure must be immediately implemented:
- Wing-Level Designation: The Base Honor Guard (BHG) must be designated as a Wing-Level Agency as it once was, parallel in authority and reporting structure to the Protocol Office. This will ensure direct oversight and mandated support from the Wing Commander.
- Mandatory Permanent Staffing: The core leadership positions must transition immediately from rotational, temporary duties to mandatory year-long permanent assignments (Special Duty):
- OIC (Captain): Mandatory position for program advocacy and command authority. Part-time.
- Superintendent (MSgt): Mandatory position for resource management and liaison. Part-time.
- NCOIC (TSgt): Mandatory position for daily operations and command liaison. Full-time, one year assignment.
- Assistant NCOIC (SSgt): Dedicated for administrative support and continuity. Full-time, one year assignment.
- Lead Trainer (SSgt): Dedicated to ceremonial training standardization and quality control, serving as the link to AFHG. Full-time, one year assignment.
- Scheduler (SrA/A1C): Dedicated administrative support. Full-time, one year assignment.
- Training Flight: Members have a two-week overlap with the Airmen they are replacing to ensure ceremonial training and uniform standards are met.
- Ceremonial Flight: 20 Airmen on the both Active and Inactive Flights
- Active Flight. Perform day-to-day ceremonial duties in their AOR.
- Inactive Flight. Perform duties back in their respective work centers. When Inactive Flight members are required to fill mission needs, they are temporarily placed on Active Flight for minimal time to fulfill the required stated mission.
- Augmentation: Reestablish the MPA augmentation of the program and encourage AP3 (Authorized Provider Partnership Program) membership.
- Ceremonial Flight Consistency: Ceremonial Flight NCOICs for A and B flights would remain mandatory SSgts but would integrate a robust turnover process with their flights every three months to ensure freshness of talent without sacrificing the structural stability of the leadership team and lessen impact on assigned organization.
- Cultural and Command Mandate: Leadership from the Wing Commander to the first-line supervisor must be encouraged to visibly show and voice support for the congressionally-mandated BHG program. They must cease disparaging or undermining the program, ensuring Airmen understand the critical and non-derogatory nature of this professional duty.
This structural change creates the necessary rank and permanence to manage logistics and demand perfection, ensuring the BHG can successfully execute the standards provided by the AFHG without administrative interference from AFMAO.
- If the AFHG is the OPR for Standards and Training, the TSgt NCOIC and SSgt Lead Trainer are the stable, permanent personnel who receive and implement that training.
- If AFMAO is relegated back to Administrative/Mortuary Affairs (policy and contracts, as it should be), the MSgt Superintendent and Captain OIC have the rank and authority to coordinate those logistical requirements without compromising the operational ceremonial mission.
From the slide deck of the course.
- Keep out of bullet number 3.
- Return bullet numbers 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, and 11 to sole AFHG control.
Furthermore, the severity of the institutional neglect—which is compromising a Congressional mandate and directly harming the veteran community—warrants a formal investigation by the Department of Defense and/or Air Force Inspector General and the Government Accountability Office to assign accountability for the failure of the OPR to properly manage the DAFI 34-160 rewrite and to ensure such systemic policy negligence can never compromise the service’s most solemn promise again.
The new DAFI 34-160. The immediate rewrite of DAFI 34-160 must formally designate the U.S. Air Force Honor Guard (AFHG) as the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for all Base Honor Guard (BHG) management and ceremonial policy guidance. All residual language concerning program management must relegate AFMAO to the role of Functional Manager exclusively for policy input concerning technical mortuary affairs (e.g., CAMO, MO/MT), thereby eliminating the detrimental dual-command conflict.
Congressional Inquiry/Inspector General Investigation
Specifically, we demand an immediate and independent review by the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to assess compliance and resource management across the program. Finally, due to the systematic neglect of duties related to the maintenance of policy and the resulting decay of good order and discipline, the actions of leadership at AF/A1 and AFMAO should be investigated for potential violations of Article 92 (Failure to Obey an Order or Regulation) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. This dual demand for structural reform and legal accountability is the only way to ensure the Air Force’s most solemn promise is never compromised again.